New AI Tackles Walker County School Board Nepotism Pending Appeals Court Ruling+Opinion; Also, Justice Scalia Lives! Sort Of.
AI channels the judicial giant to predict next week's appellate decision. My experiment testing AI's ability to predict the outcome of a real pending case before the Georgia Court of Appeals.
I've spent several years now covering local government and politics—translating bureaucratic doublespeak and legalese, digging through records, and making sense of policies seemingly designed to confuse everyone and educate no one. While this can occasionally be fascinating and sometimes interesting, let's be honest: it can also be mind-numbingly tedious.
So when OpenAI—ChatGPT— dropped their new "Deep Research" feature last month, promising an AI that could autonomously analyze complex documents and materials, synthesize information from multiple sources, and produce comprehensive reasoned analysis and reports with proper citations—all in minutes rather than hours—my interest and skepticism sensors immediately started flashing.
Tech journalists, predictably, tripped over themselves declaring it the end of knowledge work as we know it. But I've watched tech companies overpromise and underdeliver too many times to join that parade without evidence. We still don’t have jetbacks as promised and its 2025!
Since ChatGPT launched in 2022, I've incorporated AI tools into my workflow. They've been useful assistants, but hardly the transformative revolution that endless AI hype regularly promises.
When I finally gained access to Deep Research, I decided it needed a proper torture test. The results weren't just surprising. They were a bit unsettling.
Why This Case? Walker School Board Member Nepotism Legal Saga
To properly test this new AI feature, I needed a topic with layers. Something complex yet also intimately familiar to me—where I could immediately spot if the AI was getting things wrong or missing crucial context.
Enter Cagle v. Carruth & Harden, the ongoing nepotism fiasco involving Walker County's school board. For those who haven't been riveted by my ongoing coverage, this story has everything: nepotism allegations, false swearing, cronyism, archaic legal maneuvers, Latin phrases, and public accountability on trial. Plus, this court case was born from my very own articles which exposed the nepotism at issue with two school board members.
What made it perfect? The Georgia Court of Appeals hasn't ruled yet. With a decision expected by March 14th, we have a genuine unknown outcome. This meant ChatGPT couldn't simply regurgitate a known fact pattern—it would have to actually think and reason through the source materials. Which is precisely what OpenAI claims Deep Research can do.
My Testing Methodology: Setting Up the AI Challenge
Here's how I decided to test it: I would provide PDF records of the entire case—the complete trial court record and appellate record—and ask it to act as if it were the presiding judge writing the opinion for the Georgia Court of Appeals. The AI would need to provide a comprehensive analysis with a proper judicial opinion explaining the case and its ruling.
I made a mistake that turned out to be a fortunate accident. When providing the case records, I left out the Amicus Brief the Walker County School Board filed in the appeal. But after reviewing the AI's initial results, I decided to then provide the amicus brief and ask it to assume this document (listed below as “Undated Motion for leave”) had been included with the original materials, then redo the analysis.
That resulted in a second, entirely different set of results with surprising differences.
Remember this is not an AI model tuned for legal predictions or analysis, its the stock Deep Research feature from Chat GPT.
I’ll be interested to hear from my friends and readers in the legal field after reading the results. The possibilities and potential for this type of tool tuned for specific legal tasks and analysis seems immense to me.
Table of Contents
SECTION-1: First Set of Results (without Amicus brief provided)
SECTION-2: Second Set of Results (WITH amicus brief included)
SECTION-3: Justice Scalia Lives! AI Justice Scalia is a bit harsh with Superior Court Judge House.
I decided to extend my test and see how it did producing an opinion in the style and jurisprudence of the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. BEST SECTION in my opinion. Also the most concise and straightforward.
Documents Cited In Results (the website links in the results work but not the document links)
SECTION-1: First Set of Results(without Amicus brief provided)
Probabilistic Outcome Analysis: assess the likelihood of possible appellate dispositions based on Georgia precedents, the strength of the legal arguments, and the applicable standard of review.
Hypothetical Georgia Court of Appeals Opinion: a judicial opinion that mirrors an official appellate ruling, including a clear statement of facts, legal issues, and a reasoned decision.
Probabilistic Outcome Analysis
Likely Disposition – Affirmance (≈70% probability): The Georgia Court of Appeals is more likely than not to affirm the trial court’s judgment. In a bench trial, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b) (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). The trial judge, sitting as fact-finder, was entitled to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts without favoring the plaintiff’s evidence (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). Here, the judge found that Appellant Chelsea Cagle failed to prove the board members’ sons held positions as “system administrative staff” under the nepotism statute. This factual finding is reviewed on appeal for clear error and will be upheld if any evidence supports it (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw). The record provides supporting evidence – notably, the Appellant’s own witness acknowledged the sons were “coordinators” supervised by a higher-level director (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Given the deferential standard and the evidence undermining Cagle’s claim, the Court of Appeals is likely to find the trial court’s ruling was supported by some evidence and not clearly erroneous, warranting affirmance (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw).
Moreover, Georgia precedent imposes a heavy burden on appellants challenging a directed verdict/involuntary dismissal in a non-jury trial. Even if Cagle established a prima facie case, the trial court could still properly find against her on the merits (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). Cagle’s arguments on appeal – that the trial judge applied the wrong standard, that Appellees’ motion lacked specificity, and that the judge considered materials outside the trial evidence – while not frivolous, may not persuade the Court of Appeals to reverse. Georgia courts have held that a defendant’s failure to state specific grounds for directed verdict can be fatal (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf), and that considering evidence not presented at trial is error (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). However, in this case those errors are likely to be deemed harmless or non-prejudicial. The basis for the motion (insufficient proof of statutory ineligibility) was apparent and addressed at trial (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf), and the key facts from the off-record documents (the sons’ job titles and duties) were elicited through witness testimony (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Therefore, the appellate court can conclude that, even confining review to the proper trial evidence, the outcome remains the same. In sum, because any evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the board members were not disqualified, an affirmance is the most probable result (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw).
Possible Disposition – Reversal & Remand (≈30% probability): There is a meaningful possibility that the Court of Appeals could reverse the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings. This would occur if the panel determines that the trial court committed prejudicial legal error. One potential ground is the consideration of materials outside the trial evidence. The trial judge explicitly stated he based his ruling “on the documents filed in the summary judgment” record (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf), effectively allowing Appellees to use affidavit evidence without live testimony or cross-examination (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). Georgia law indicates that once a case proceeds to a bench trial on the merits, the court should decide it on the evidence presented at trial, not on pre-trial pleadings or motions (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). An appellate court concerned with this due process issue could find that Cagle was prejudiced by the reliance on outside evidence, since she was not afforded the opportunity to challenge it during trial. In that event, the remedy would likely be reversal of the judgment and a remand for a new trial or further fact-finding confined to proper evidence.
Another possible ground for reversal is the lack of specificity in Appellees’ directed verdict motion. Georgia precedent holds that a trial court cannot grant a directed verdict on an unspecified ground (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Here, Appellees’ motion merely asserted that Cagle “failed to carry her burden” without articulating which element was unproven (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Cagle objected at trial to this vagueness (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). If the appellate court strictly applies this rule, it could determine that the directed verdict was procedurally improper and reverse on that basis. However, appellate courts often look to whether the opposing party suffered prejudice or had an opportunity to respond. Given that Cagle did respond by summarizing her evidence (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf), the court may find the issue was effectively joined and not warranting reversal. Still, the chance of reversal increases if the panel believes these procedural missteps – considering non-evidentiary materials and granting a motion lacking specific grounds – combined to deny Cagle a fair trial on the merits.
On balance, while a reversal and remand for a full trial on the quo warranto petition is conceivable (particularly if the court is troubled by the trial judge’s handling of the evidence), the safer bet is that the Court of Appeals will affirm the result. The Appellant’s legal arguments raise important points, but the strength of Appellees’ position under the law and the evidence makes an affirmance more likely than not. Any reversal would most likely be limited to ordering further proceedings (a new trial) rather than a directed judgment in Cagle’s favor, since Appellees have not yet presented their defense evidence and the case would need to be fully tried. In summary, the probabilities tilt toward affirmance, with a smaller but notable chance of reversal and remand if the appellate court decides the trial court’s errors were harmful enough to merit a new trial.
Hypothetical Judicial Opinion (Georgia Court of Appeals)
Introduction
Procedural Posture: This appeal arises from a judgment of the Superior Court of Walker County in a quo warranto action. Appellant Chelsea Cagle initiated proceedings to challenge the eligibility of Appellees Mike Carruth and Karen Harden (“the board members”) to serve on the Walker County Board of Education, alleging that they are disqualified under Georgia’s school board nepotism statute. The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 28, 2024, after the trial court denied Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. At the close of Cagle’s evidence, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for directed verdict (treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury trial) and entered judgment in favor of Appellees, dismissing the quo warranto petition with prejudice (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Cagle now appeals that final judgment, enumerating as error: (1) the trial court’s failure to apply the proper standard (“any evidence” test) in ruling on the motion; (2) the lack of specificity in Appellees’ directed verdict motion; and (3) the trial court’s consideration of materials outside the trial evidence when reaching its decision (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
Summary of Issues: The central issue on the merits is whether the trial evidence established that Appellees are statutorily ineligible to hold office due to their sons’ employment with the school system. Resolution of the appeal also implicates procedural questions about the standard of review and proof in a bench trial and the proper scope of materials the trial court could consider. We must determine (a) whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Cagle’s evidence, (b) whether Appellees’ motion for directed verdict was sufficiently specific to support the judgment, and (c) whether any impropriety in the court’s reliance on documents outside of the trial record requires reversal. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.
Statement of the Case
Factual Background: In September 2023, Cagle (a citizen and taxpayer of Walker County (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf)) sought to challenge the legal right of Mike Carruth and Karen Harden to serve on the local Board of Education. Her action in the nature of quo warranto was premised on Georgia’s school board member qualifications statute, OCGA § 20-2-51(a)(4)(A) (the “nepotism statute”). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “no person who has an immediate family member … serving as the local school superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) It was undisputed that Appellee Carruth’s son (Justin Carruth) and Appellee Harden’s son (Brandon “Scott” Harden) are employed by the Walker County School District (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Justin has been employed as the “Coordinator of Secondary Curriculum/CTAE” since 2021 (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf), and Scott has been the “Coordinator of Instructional Technology” since 2017 (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Cagle contended that these positions amount to “system administrative staff” in the school system, thereby disqualifying the parents from board service (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Appellees, on the other hand, maintained that their sons’ roles are not within the meaning of “system administrative staff” as intended by the statute, because those roles are below the level of “director.” In support, Appellees pointed to local policy: the Walker County School System, like others in Georgia, defines “system administrative staff” to include only positions of “director or higher.” Affidavits from the Superintendent and the Human Resources Director (introduced at pre-trial stages) explained that under the District’s hierarchy, “Directors are considered ‘system administrative staff,’” but “Coordinators are not,” and that Justin and Scott hold the title of Coordinator rather than Director (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Thus, the key factual dispute was whether the sons’ coordinator positions qualified as “system administrative staff” under the statute’s purview.
Proceedings Below: On December 19, 2023, the superior court granted Cagle’s application for leave to file a quo warranto information, finding she had the requisite interest to bring the action (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The court issued a writ of quo warranto and set the matter for a non-jury trial on March 28, 2024 (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Before trial, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss and later a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Cagle’s claim failed as a matter of law because the sons’ jobs were not disqualifying positions (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss (by email correspondence) and deferred the summary judgment ruling until the day of trial (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). On the morning of trial, the court heard oral arguments on summary judgment and announced it had “read everything” in the record (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). After considering the arguments, the court found a factual dispute and denied summary judgment, clearing the case to proceed to trial on the merits (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
At the bench trial, Cagle bore the burden of proof to show that Appellees unlawfully hold office (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). In her case-in-chief, Cagle called three witnesses (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). One critical witness was Phyllis Hunter, the chair of the Board of Education. On direct examination, Ms. Hunter testified that “Justin is the director of CTAE and Scott is [the] director of technology.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) This supported Cagle’s theory that the sons functioned as de facto “directors” heading system programs. However, on cross-examination, Ms. Hunter clarified her testimony, acknowledging, “Yes, they are called coordinators as well.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) She further agreed that Robyn Samples is a “Director” in the school system who has supervisory authority over both Justin and Scott (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Thus, the only evidence presented at trial established that while Justin and Scott might informally be referred to as “directors” by some, their official title is Coordinator and they report to an actual Director (Ms. Samples) with broader responsibilities (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Cagle did not present any additional evidence (such as written job descriptions or testimony from the sons or their supervisors) to prove that the Coordinator positions should be deemed “director” level or considered “system administrative staff” under the law. After Cagle rested her case, Appellees moved for a directed verdict, arguing generally that Cagle had failed to carry her burden of proof (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
The trial court granted the motion and issued its ruling from the bench. The judge concluded that Cagle had not proven that Appellees’ sons held positions at the director level. In an oral explanation, the judge reasoned: “I don’t think the plaintiff has met that burden to say they’re a director… You can call, I mean, they call maintenance people sanitation engineers. That doesn’t make them an engineer… So whether they’re called director… that doesn’t make it change.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) He noted that Ms. Hunter’s own testimony showed the sons’ duties were different and subordinate to their “actual boss,” Ms. Samples (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). The court explicitly stated that “based on the documents filed in the summary judgment” record, it found the job descriptions of the two sons to be clear, and on that basis it was “going to grant the directed verdict.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) A written final order was entered on March 30, 2024, dismissing the quo warranto petition with prejudice. The order recites that, after presentation of Cagle’s case, she “did not carry the burden of proof… because the board members’ sons’ positions in the school system are not ‘system administrative staff’ positions within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(4)(A).” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) Cagle timely filed a notice of appeal from this judgment (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf) (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf).
Legal Analysis
Standard of Review: Because this case was tried without a jury, Appellees’ motion for a directed verdict is treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b) (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). It is well-settled that “[i]n a non-jury case, the trial judge… has the power to adjudicate the case on the merits at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case.” Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 (1975) (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator) (citing OCGA § 9-11-41(b)). In this posture, the trial court as the finder of fact may weigh the evidence, assess witness credibility, and even render judgment against the plaintiff “even though [the] plaintiff may have established a prima facie case.” Id. (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). There is no requirement that the court view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff or refrain from making factual determinations in the defendant’s favor at that stage (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator) (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw).
On appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41(b), we apply a highly deferential standard of review. The trial court’s factual findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,” and due regard is given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge witness credibility (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw) (quoting OCGA § 9-11-52(a)). Stated differently, “the trial court’s ruling on an OCGA § 9-11-41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support it.” Magnus Homes, LLC v. DeRosa, 248 Ga. App. 31, 32(1) (2001) (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw). We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; our role is simply to ensure that the trial court’s conclusions are supported by at least some competent evidence and that no material legal error affected the outcome (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw).
With these principles in mind, we address each of Appellant’s claims of error in turn.
1. Application of the “Any Evidence” Test in a Bench Trial: Cagle first argues that the trial court “failed to use the required ‘any evidence’ test” and thereby erred in granting a directed verdict when some evidence supported her claim. This argument misapprehends the applicable standard. The “any evidence” test, as Cagle invokes it, is the standard for appellate review of fact-findings – not a rule governing the trial judge’s decision-making in a bench trial. In a jury trial, a directed verdict may only be granted if “there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence… demands a particular verdict” in favor of the movant, with all evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw). However, “[i]n a non-jury case, it is procedurally incorrect to move for a directed verdict,” and such a motion “has no meaning when a case is tried without a jury.” Drake v. Wallace, 259 Ga. App. 111, 112 (2003) (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw) (quotations omitted). The motion is instead treated as one for involuntary dismissal, and the trial judge “must weigh the evidence” and is “not required to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Pichulik v. Air Conditioning & Heating Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 195, 197 (1971) (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator); see also Kennery, 133 Ga. App. at 880 (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator). In short, the trial court’s duty was to evaluate whether Cagle had proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence at the close of her presentation, not merely to look for “any evidence” in her favor. The record shows the court understood and performed this fact-finding role. The judge explicitly noted, “I know there is not really a dispute of fact, but … I don’t think the plaintiff has met [her] burden to say they’re a director.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) Rather than ignoring Cagle’s evidence, the court considered it and found it insufficient to carry her ultimate burden of persuasion. This was fully within the court’s authority in a bench trial (Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879 | Casetext Search + Citator).
On appeal, we likewise do not ask whether Cagle presented any supportive evidence, but whether the trial court’s adverse finding is supported by evidence such that it was not clearly erroneous. The trial court concluded that Justin Carruth and Scott Harden do not occupy positions that fall within the statutory term “system administrative staff.” That finding is amply supported by the trial evidence. Notably, Cagle’s own witness, Ms. Hunter, conceded that both sons were actually “called coordinators” and worked under an individual who held the title of Director (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). It was uncontroverted at trial that neither Justin nor Scott was officially a “director” in the school system hierarchy – a fact which, under the District’s policy, meant their roles were not considered part of the system administrative staff (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Even absent the local policy, the trial judge could reasonably infer from the testimony about the sons’ subordinate roles that they did not hold high-level administrative positions contemplated by the nepotism statute. In quo warranto cases, the burden of proof is on the party challenging the officer’s qualifications (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf), and a court may find that burden unmet if the evidence leaves a genuine question about whether the statutory criteria are satisfied (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Here, Cagle’s proof fell short of establishing that the sons’ employment fits the narrow category of disqualifying relationships. Because the trial court’s determination on this point is supported by the evidence and not against the clear weight of the record, we discern no error in the court’s application of the law to Cagle’s evidence. To the contrary, the court applied the correct standard under OCGA § 9-11-41(b) and made a factual finding that is entitled to deference on appeal (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw).
2. Specificity of Appellees’ Motion for Directed Verdict: Cagle next contends that the directed verdict (involuntary dismissal) must be overturned because Appellees failed to state specific grounds for their motion. It is true that in general, “if a defendant moves for a directed verdict but states no grounds, he is not entitled to the verdict.” Rogers v. Joyner, 145 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1978) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). A motion simply asserting that the plaintiff “failed to carry her burden” – as happened here – is arguably too vague to satisfy the requirement that grounds be stated with specificity (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The purpose of this rule is to ensure that the trial court and the opposing party understand the precise basis on which a dismissal is sought, so that any deficiency in proof can potentially be addressed or at least so that the non-moving party has a fair opportunity to argue against the motion. See Turk v. Jackson Elec. Membership Corp., 177 Ga. App. 631 (1986) (directed verdict grounds must be set forth with specificity) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
In the present case, Appellees’ counsel, at the close of Cagle’s evidence, stated: “I don’t believe [Cagle has] carried [her] burden today.” (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) He did not itemize which element of Cagle’s case was lacking. Cagle’s counsel immediately objected that no specific grounds were articulated (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court did not explicitly demand clarification from Appellees; instead, the court allowed Cagle’s counsel to respond on the record. In her response, Cagle’s counsel highlighted the evidence she had presented (emphasizing that the sons were employed in the school system in what she viewed as administrative capacities) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court then ruled, focusing on the failure of proof that the sons occupied “director” roles (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf).
Although we do not condone the practice of moving for directed verdict (or dismissal) without clearly stating the legal basis, we are not persuaded that this lapse requires reversal under the circumstances. Unlike a jury trial – where an unspecified directed verdict motion could prejudice the nonmovant’s ability to remedy a defect or tailor argument before the case goes to the jury – here the judge was the trier of fact and was intimately familiar with the issues in dispute. The record shows that the basis for Appellees’ motion was apparent: they contended Cagle had not proven that the nepotism statute applied, i.e. that the sons were “system administrative staff.” Cagle herself understood this to be the crux of the motion, as evidenced by her rebuttal argument detailing how the evidence showed the sons’ positions were administrative (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). In essence, the lack of formality in stating the grounds caused no prejudice because the trial court and both parties knew exactly which issue was dispositive – whether the sons’ job status met the statutory prohibition (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
Furthermore, given our conclusion that the trial court correctly applied the bench trial standard and was authorized to find against Cagle on the merits, it would exalt form over substance to void the judgment solely due to the motion’s phrasing. The trial judge made factual findings and a legal conclusion fully resolving the core issue, which we have determined was supported by the evidence. Under these circumstances, any technical deficiency in the motion’s specificity did not affect Cagle’s substantial rights. She was not ambushed by an unforeseeable argument; nor did the court grant relief on an entirely unargued or different ground. Instead, the court ruled on the very issue that had been contested throughout the case – the qualification of the board members under OCGA § 20-2-51(a)(4)(A). We therefore decline to reverse the judgment on this procedural ground. See Best v. CB Decatur Court, LLC, 324 Ga. App. 403, 410 (2013) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (an argument or theory not raised in the trial court cannot be introduced on appeal, and implicit or contextually evident grounds are considered in substance). Here, the theory of the case remained the same, and the trial court’s ruling, though prompted by a less-than-specific motion, was based on the merits of that theory. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the handling of Appellees’ motion for directed verdict in the trial court.
3. Consideration of Extra-Record Materials: Finally, Cagle asserts that the trial court erred by considering documents and affidavits from the summary judgment record – which were not introduced into evidence during the trial – when deciding to grant the directed verdict. The transcript indeed reflects that the judge, in delivering his oral ruling, said: “[B]ased on the documents filed in the summary judgment, I’m going to grant the directed verdict.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) Those documents included affidavits from the Superintendent and HR Director, as well as job descriptions, establishing the official definition of “system administrative staff” and the nature of Justin’s and Scott’s positions (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Normally, once a case proceeds to trial, the court’s decision must be grounded in the evidence presented at trial, and it is improper to rely on factual materials that were merely part of pre-trial motions or pleadings (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). See Fleeman v. Canal Ins. Co., 302 Ga. App. 231, 232 (2010) (after a bench trial is held, a pending motion for summary judgment becomes moot and the case should be decided on the trial evidence) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). The trial court here blurred the line between the summary judgment stage and the trial – essentially incorporating the affidavit evidence into the trial record without formal introduction. This was, in a technical sense, an error: Cagle did not have the opportunity to cross-examine those affiants or directly refute the statements in those documents during trial. In effect, the court “allowed the Board Members to put up a case without having to put up a case,” by using their affidavit evidence in rendering judgment (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf).
The question remains whether this error warrants reversal. We conclude that, on the facts of this case, it does not. Any evidentiary error was harmless because the substance of the affidavits was cumulative of, and consistent with, the live testimony given at trial. Ms. Hunter’s admissions during cross-examination established the key points that the affidavits likewise asserted: namely, that the school system classifies Justin and Scott as coordinators, not directors, and that a higher-level director (Samples) oversees them (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). In other words, the critical factual information needed to decide the case was properly before the court through testimony. The trial court did not rely on some wholly new fact that surfaced only in an affidavit; it relied on the organizational context (who reports to whom, and the level of the positions) which was confirmed under oath at trial. Thus, even if we excise the summary judgment documents from consideration, the outcome remains the same. The trial evidence – particularly Ms. Hunter’s testimony – unequivocally showed a hierarchical difference between the sons’ jobs and true “director” positions (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Cagle presented no evidence to contradict that point or to prove that the statutory term “system administrative staff” should be interpreted more broadly than the local policy. Accordingly, the trial court’s ultimate finding (that Appellees’ sons do not hold “system administrative staff” positions) is sufficiently supported by competent evidence from the trial. Under the applicable standard of review, as long as there is any evidence supporting the trial court’s factual finding, we will not disturb it (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Here, there is not just “any” evidence – there is substantial undisputed evidence that the sons are lower-level administrators rather than high-level system executives. We therefore conclude that, although the trial court improperly referenced materials outside the trial record, no reversible harm has been shown. See, e.g., Hamil v. Stanford, 264 Ga. 801, 802 (1994) (affirming involuntary dismissal where trial court’s findings were supported by some evidence) (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw) (DRAKE v. WALLACE (2003) | FindLaw). We caution, however, that the better practice is for trial courts to base their rulings strictly on evidence admitted during trial. Parties in a bench trial are entitled to know and address all of the evidence that the court will consider in deciding the case (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). In this case, because the trial court’s reliance on the summary judgment filings did not introduce any fact not already established by the trial testimony, the error does not affect the validity of the judgment.
Statutory Interpretation: Although not raised as a separate enumeration of error, Cagle’s arguments on appeal also implicate the interpretation of the term “system administrative staff” in OCGA § 20-2-51(a)(4)(A). We briefly address this for completeness. The Code does not define “system administrative staff” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Appellant urged the trial court to apply the ordinary meanings of those words – essentially contending that any staff member in the school system’s administration (in any capacity) would qualify, and noting that Justin and Scott undeniably work on the school system’s administrative staff in a general sense (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court, however, looked for guidance to the State Board of Education and local Board policy. The Georgia Department of Education has indicated that because the phrase is undefined in the statute or state rules, it “may be [defined] by local board policy.” (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf) Walker County’s policy, as established by uncontroverted affidavit evidence, limits “system administrative staff” to positions of Director or above (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). We find the trial court’s approach consistent with sound principles of statutory construction and the realities of school governance. In the context of a nepotism rule, it is logical that the legislature intended to bar board members who have relatives in high-level administrative roles that could create conflicts of interest or undue influence (such as superintendent, principal, or central office director positions). Lower-level employees – even if in administrative or support roles – may not pose the same concern. By deferring to the local school system’s definition, the trial court respected the statutory scheme’s reliance on local distinctions and ensured that the term “system administrative staff” was applied in a manner consistent with the school system’s own organizational structure (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf) (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf). Under Walker County’s definition, neither Justin nor Scott is in a position of “director or higher,” and therefore neither is “system administrative staff.” The trial evidence corroborated that they are coordinators reporting to a director, which by definition falls outside the prohibited category (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Thus, even under a de novo interpretation of the statute, the superior court reached the correct substantive result: Appellees are not disqualified from board service by OCGA § 20-2-51(a)(4)(A) because their sons do not hold the kind of positions that statute encompasses. Cagle’s quo warranto claim fails on the merits for that reason.
Conclusion
In quo warranto proceedings, the courts are tasked with carefully balancing the enforcement of statutory eligibility requirements against the evidence presented to justify removing an elected official. Here, after a full (albeit brief) bench trial, the Superior Court found that Cagle did not meet her burden of proving that the board members held their offices unlawfully. We have reviewed the record and applicable law and conclude that the trial court’s judgment is supported by evidence and free of reversible error. The trial judge, acting as fact-finder, was authorized to weigh the testimony and make credibility determinations. Cagle’s evidence, even taken at face value, did not compel a finding in her favor, and the contrary evidence (including admissions from her own witness) supported the court’s decision. Any procedural or evidentiary missteps did not prejudice the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
All Judges concur.
Caveat: This analysis and opinion are hypothetical and are provided for educational purposes only. They do not reflect an actual decision of the Court of Appeals and do not constitute legal advice.
SECTION-2: Second Set of Results (WITH amicus brief included)
I will now incorporate the arguments and legal analysis from the amicus brief into the full appellate analysis. This will include updating the probabilistic outcome assessment and refining the hypothetical appellate opinion to reflect any new or strengthened legal positions presented by the amicus submission.
Probabilistic Outcome Analysis
Affirmance (Approx. 20% Probability): The Court of Appeals could affirm if it defers to the trial court’s role as fact-finder in this bench trial and finds some evidence supporting the judgment. In a non-jury trial, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b), and the trial court’s findings must be upheld if there is any evidence to support them (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Here, the trial judge had evidence suggesting that the board members’ sons were not in positions covered by the nepotism law – notably, testimony that the sons were officially “Coordinators” rather than “Directors,” with a superior (Robyn Samples) above them in the organizational hierarchy (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). If the appellate court accepts the local school system’s definition that only “director or higher” positions constitute “system administrative staff” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf), it may conclude the trial court correctly found the sons’ positions fell outside the statute’s scope (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Furthermore, the Court might find that any procedural errors (such as the lack of specificity in the directed verdict motion or the consideration of materials outside the trial evidence) were harmless, given that the outcome would be the same under the local definition of disqualifying employment. Under this view, the trial court had “sufficient evidence” and acted within its discretion as fact-finder, so its decision would not be disturbed on appeal (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf).
Reversal & Remand (Approx. 75% Probability): It is more likely the Court of Appeals will reverse the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings. Several factors support this outcome. First, the trial court appears to have applied an incorrect legal standard by effectively requiring the plaintiff to prove the sons were “directors” by title, even though the disqualifying statute does not explicitly limit “system administrative staff” to those with that title (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). This narrowed interpretation may contradict the ordinary meaning of the term and the legislative intent to broadly prohibit nepotism in school systems (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). Second, the directed verdict motion was stated only in general terms – counsel merely argued that the plaintiff “failed to carry [her] burden” (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) – which lacked the specificity required to support a judgment as a matter of law. Georgia law requires that a motion for directed verdict state specific grounds (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf), so that a party is not ambushed and has a chance to cure any evidentiary gap (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Here, the vague motion did not alert the appellant that she needed, for example, more evidence of the sons’ job duties or the school system’s job classifications. Third, the record shows the trial judge explicitly relied on documents filed with the summary judgment motion (such as affidavits from the Superintendent and HR director) in granting the directed verdict (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Considering evidence not introduced at trial is a legal error (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) – once the case proceeded to a bench trial on the merits, the court should have based its ruling only on the trial evidence (or evidence properly admitted by stipulation or judicial notice) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). The appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine the authors of those affidavits at trial (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf), which raises fairness concerns. Because the trial court’s decision was premised on an incomplete and procedurally improper record, the Court of Appeals is likely to find that the directed verdict was premature. In light of these errors, a reversal is probable, with instructions to hold further proceedings (a new trial or continuation of the quo warranto hearing) so that all relevant evidence can be properly developed and the correct legal standard applied (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf).
Other Outcomes (Approx. 5% Probability): A less likely outcome could be a partial remand for clarification or additional fact-finding without a full reversal, but given the posture (a final judgment on directed verdict), the appellate court would more typically either affirm or reverse that judgment outright. The Court is unlikely to issue a final ruling on the merits of the quo warranto (such as directly ordering removal of the board members) without a fact-finder fully examining whether the sons’ roles qualify as “system administrative staff” under the law. Instead, if the appellant’s position is deemed correct as a matter of law, the Court might reverse and direct entry of judgment in her favor only if the facts are truly undisputed and only one legal conclusion is possible (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). However, here there is a factual dispute (or at least a dispute in the interpretation of what the facts mean legally) about the nature of the sons’ jobs. Therefore, the most pragmatic outcome if error is found would be to reverse the dismissal and remand the case to the trial court. This would allow the parties to present additional evidence (if necessary) and have the trial court decide, under proper standards, whether the board members are disqualified from holding office.
Caveat: The above outcome probabilities are speculative and reasoned from the legal arguments and record; they do not guarantee any result. The analysis is provided for informational purposes and is not legal advice.
Hypothetical Judicial Opinion
(Georgia Court of Appeals, Case No. A24A1482)
Introduction
Procedural Posture: This appeal arises from the Superior Court of Walker County’s final judgment in a quo warranto proceeding that tested the eligibility of two members of the Walker County Board of Education to hold office. Appellant Chelsea Cagle, a local taxpayer, petitioned for a writ of quo warranto to oust Appellees Mike Carruth and Karen Harden from the school board, alleging they are disqualified by Georgia’s anti-nepotism law. After a non-jury trial, the superior court granted a directed verdict (treated as an involuntary dismissal) in favor of Appellees, concluding that Cagle failed to prove the statutory disqualification. Cagle now appeals that ruling, asserting that the trial court misapplied the law and prematurely terminated the case (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf).
Issues on Appeal: The central issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the quo warranto petition at the close of Cagle’s evidence. Resolution of this issue turns on: (1) the interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A), Georgia’s school board nepotism statute – specifically, the meaning of “system administrative staff” – and whether Appellees each have an immediate family member in such a position; (2) whether the evidence presented by Cagle was sufficient to create a factual question on Appellees’ qualifications for office; and (3) whether procedural errors (such as an unspecific directed verdict motion and the trial court’s reliance on materials outside the trial evidence) require reversal. An amicus curiae brief filed by the Walker County Board of Education urges reversal, offering the Board’s perspective on how it classifies “system administrative staff” under the law. We address each of these matters below.
Statement of the Case
Factual Background: Georgia law prohibits certain public school nepotism. Under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A), “No person who has an immediate family member … serving as the local school superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education,” with an exception for family members employed in those positions before 2010 (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). An “immediate family member” includes a child of the board member (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Local boards of education are required to adopt codes of ethics and nepotism policies consistent with this statute (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf), and may define the scope of “system administrative staff” for their own school system (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). The clear legislative purpose is to prevent a school board member from holding office while close relatives occupy influential or administrative positions in the same school system (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf).
Appellees Carruth and Harden are elected members of the Walker County Board of Education. It is undisputed that each Appellee has a son employed by the Walker County school system (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Carruth’s son, Justin Carruth, has been employed since July 1, 2021 as the Coordinator of Secondary Curriculum and CTAE (Career, Technical, and Agricultural Education) for the school district (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Harden’s son, Brandon “Scott” Harden, has been employed since August 28, 2017 as the Coordinator of Instructional Technology for the district (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Both sons began these positions after January 1, 2010, so no timing exemption applies. The question is whether these positions make them “system administrative staff” within the meaning of the statute.
Proceedings Below: In September 2023, Cagle sought leave to file an Information in the Nature of Quo Warranto challenging Carruth’s and Harden’s right to hold office (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf) (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf). The superior court granted leave and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing (non-jury trial). Appellees moved to dismiss, and later moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cagle’s claim lacked merit because their sons’ jobs did not fall under any disqualifying category (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). In support, Appellees submitted affidavits from the Superintendent and the Human Resources Director of Walker County Schools, stating that the school system internally defines “system administrative staff” as those holding the title of “Director or higher,” and that Justin and Scott occupy “Coordinator” positions rather than Director positions (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf).
On March 28, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on the summary judgment motion, then denied summary judgment, finding a factual dispute remained (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The court immediately proceeded to a bench trial on the merits that same day (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Cagle presented three witnesses in her case-in-chief (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Notably, Phyllis Hunter, the Chair of the Walker County Board of Education, testified that she was familiar with both Justin Carruth and Scott Harden and their roles. On direct examination, Chair Hunter stated unequivocally that “Justin is the director of CTAE and Scott is director of technology” for the school system (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). She further characterized both positions as “administrative” in nature (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). However, on cross-examination, Hunter acknowledged that “they are called coordinators as well” and agreed that another employee – Robyn Samples – was a Director in the same department with supervisory authority over Justin and Scott (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Thus, the testimony established that while Justin and Scott were sometimes informally referred to as “directors” of their respective programs, their official job titles were “Coordinator,” and they reported to a higher-level Director (Ms. Samples). Cagle did not introduce the school district’s written nepotism policy or job classification documents into evidence during her case. Rather, her strategy rested on the statutory language and the inference that a coordinator of a system-wide program is part of the “system administrative staff.”
At the close of Cagle’s evidence, Appellees moved for a directed verdict (in a bench trial, properly understood as a motion for involuntary dismissal) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Appellees’ counsel did not articulate any particular deficiency in the proof; counsel argued only that Cagle had not “carried [her] burden” of proof (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Cagle’s counsel objected to the motion’s lack of specificity, noting that Appellees had “not elaborated in what way” the burden had not been met (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court did not ask for or receive any clarification of the grounds. Cagle briefly summarized why she believed she had made a prima facie case (pointing to evidence that the sons were employed by the system in administrative roles) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
After taking the motion under consideration, the trial court delivered an oral ruling from the bench granting a directed verdict for Appellees. The court stated that it “did not really find a dispute of fact” but concluded Cagle failed to prove that Justin and Scott “are a director” (emphasis added) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Using a colorful analogy, the judge observed that people may be given inflated titles – “they call maintenance people sanitation engineers. That doesn’t make them an engineer” – implying that calling someone a director does not make it so if the actual job duties or hierarchy suggest otherwise (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The court noted Chair Hunter’s testimony that Justin’s and Scott’s duties were different and narrower than those of their supervisor, Ms. Samples, whose job was “more broad and had more duties” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). The court concluded that “the job description of the two sons” did not meet the definition of system administrative staff required for disqualification (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Notably, the judge expressly stated that “based on the documents filed in the summary judgment, I’m going to grant the directed verdict.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). This indicates the court relied on the affidavits and other materials from the pre-trial motions – which were not introduced as evidence during the trial – to inform its decision. On March 30, 2024, the trial court entered a written “Final Judgment and Decree” dismissing Cagle’s quo warranto petition with prejudice, finding that “the board members’ sons’ positions in the school system are not ‘system administrative staff’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(4)(A).” (A24A1482 - Record Volume 2.pdf)
Cagle timely appealed. She enumerates as error (1) the grant of a directed verdict despite some supporting evidence in her favor (arguing the court failed to apply the favorable “any evidence” standard); (2) the insufficiency of Appellees’ motion for directed verdict, which stated no specific grounds and thus should not have been granted; and (3) the trial court’s reliance on materials outside the trial evidence (e.g., summary judgment affidavits) in rendering its decision (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The Walker County Board of Education, as amicus curiae supporting Cagle, echoes these arguments and further contends that the trial court’s focus on job titles (“director” vs. “coordinator”) was misplaced in light of the Board’s own policies and the broad intent of the nepotism statute.
Legal Analysis
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Because this was a bench trial, the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict is treated as a grant of involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). In a non-jury case, the trial judge weighs the evidence and may render judgment against the plaintiff after the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence if the judge is not convinced of the plaintiff’s right to relief (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). The standard of appellate review for an involuntary dismissal is highly deferential: we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous,” and we will affirm the judgment if there is any evidence to support it (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). See Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 (1975) (a directed verdict in a bench trial is reviewed as a 41(b) dismissal); Drake v. Wallace, 259 Ga. App. 111, 112-113 (2003) (in a bench trial, the judge need not view evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may decide the case if the plaintiff’s evidence is found insufficient). Importantly, however, a trial court’s legal conclusions – including interpretation of statutes and the application of law to undisputed facts – are reviewed de novo. And procedural rulings that affect a party’s opportunity to fully present its case are also subject to appellate scrutiny.
To place the legal issue in context: a quo warranto proceeding is the proper vehicle to challenge the qualifications of a public officer, and the burden of proof rests on the challenger (here, Cagle) to establish the office-holder’s ineligibility (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Georgia’s nepotism rule for school boards, as codified in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A) (the “nepotism statute”), provides that a person cannot serve on a local board of education if an immediate family member is employed in certain positions in that school system (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Those positions include “local school superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff.” (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) The statute itself does not define “system administrative staff.” By state regulation, local boards were instructed to adopt policies on nepotism consistent with this law and were permitted to define the term “system administrative staff” in their local policies (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). Guidance from the Georgia Department of Education (GaDOE) suggests that “system administrative staff” generally refers to “employees of the local school district assigned to duties other than instructing students.” (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) In other words, it encompasses district-level or central office personnel – as opposed to school-based teachers – but the precise coverage can be tailored by the local board. At a minimum, however, local policies must be at least as strict as the statutory prohibition (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (a board could choose to disqualify even more categories of relatives, but not fewer).
Here, the Walker County Board of Education’s policy and practice are at the heart of the dispute. Appellees contended – via affidavits submitted with their pre-trial motions – that the Board’s interpretation of “system administrative staff” covers only positions at the Director level or above, and that “Coordinators” are not considered part of system administrative staff (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Cagle, conversely, argued that regardless of title, the sons clearly occupy administrative staff roles in the school system (managing district-wide programs in curriculum and technology), which in ordinary parlance makes them “system administrative staff” within the meaning of the law (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The amicus Board of Education’s brief clarifies that the Board indeed has an official policy on “Administrative and Supervisory Personnel” distinguishing “System-wide Directors” and “System-wide Coordinators,” but the Board maintains that both categories are part of the administrative staff of the system (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). In fact, the Board (amicus) points out that it produces an annual list of “System Administrative Staff” which, for FY2025, includes Justin Carruth and Scott Harden by name as Coordinators (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). This indicates the Board’s own view that the sons’ positions fall under the nepotism policy’s umbrella. We note, however, that this particular evidence (the Board’s list) was not introduced at trial; it is brought to our attention via the amicus brief as an offer of proof of what could have been shown had the trial court required more specificity or allowed Cagle to reopen her case (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). Our analysis, therefore, must primarily rest on the record made in the trial court.
With these principles in mind, we address whether the trial court’s dismissal of the petition – at the close of Cagle’s evidence – was proper. We examine (A) whether the trial court applied the correct standard in evaluating the motion and evidence, (B) whether Cagle’s evidence, taken in the light of the proper legal definition of “system administrative staff,” was sufficient to overcome a motion for dismissal, and (C) whether any procedural irregularities warrant reversal.
A. Directed Verdict vs. Involuntary Dismissal in a Bench Trial – Proper Standard
As noted, in a bench trial the judge has the authority to adjudicate the case after the plaintiff’s presentation if the judge determines that the plaintiff has not proven her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the judge may weigh the evidence and is not required to presume the plaintiff’s witnesses are credible or to draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). This is a critical distinction from a jury trial directed verdict, where courts apply the “any evidence” test in favor of the non-movant (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
In the case at bar, however, there is an important caveat: while the trial court could have weighed witness credibility and made factual findings on disputed points, the transcript reveals that the court did not explicitly discredit any witness or resolve any conflicting testimony. Instead, the court’s ruling was based on a perceived absence of evidence on a particular element – namely, proof that the sons occupied positions qualifying as “system administrative staff” – rather than a rejection of Cagle’s evidence as unbelievable. The court said, “I don’t think the plaintiff has met that burden to say they’re a director,” and noted that Ms. Hunter’s testimony showed the sons had a boss with broader duties (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). In substance, the court treated the matter similarly to a directed verdict in a jury case, focusing on a purported gap in the plaintiff’s proof (the job “description” or classification of the sons) rather than weighing the overall evidence and credibility in a qualitative manner.
Crucially, the trial court also stated it had “read everything” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) – referencing the affidavits and pleadings from the pre-trial motions – and explicitly based its decision “on the documents filed in the summary judgment.” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). In a bench trial, a judge may take notice of items in the record, but the judge should not rely on factual assertions outside the trial evidence unless the parties have stipulated to them or there is no objection. Here, Cagle had no advance warning that the affidavits (which labeled the sons as “Coordinators” and opined on the definition of administrative staff) would be used as if they were evidence. Those affidavits were not entered into evidence during trial, nor were the affiants subject to cross-examination. Once the case moved to trial, the summary judgment record was superseded by the trial record – the court was obligated to decide the case based on the evidence adduced in open court (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). See Fleeman v. Canal Ins. Co., 302 Ga. App. 231, 232 (2010) (after a bench trial is held, the court may not revert to considering the pre-trial summary judgment materials as evidence). By relying on those materials without formally admitting them or affording Cagle an opportunity to rebut them, the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and procedure in granting judgment. This was not a proper exercise of the trial court’s fact-finding role, but rather a premature termination of the case on what amounts to an evidentiary technicality.
We acknowledge Appellees’ argument that, regardless of how the motion was styled, the end result is an involuntary dismissal which should be affirmed if right for any reason and supported by any evidence. However, an appellate court cannot ignore prejudicial procedural errors on the theory that the outcome could have been the same absent those errors. The invited error doctrine does not apply to allow a party to benefit on appeal from a more favorable standard of review when that party failed to invoke the correct standard below (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - REPLY BRIEF-NT.pdf). Here, Appellees moved for a “directed verdict” without invoking OCGA § 9-11-41(b) or asking the judge to weigh credibility at trial. The trial court ruled in terms of evidentiary deficiency (more akin to a directed verdict) and did not make alternative findings of fact that would merit deference under a clearly erroneous standard. Under these circumstances, we scrutinize whether the grant of the motion was legally appropriate, rather than automatically defaulting to an “any evidence supports it” affirmance.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence and Statutory Interpretation of “System Administrative Staff”
The pivotal legal question is what constitutes “system administrative staff” under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A), and whether Cagle presented enough evidence that Justin and Scott fit that category. Because the statute does not define the term, we must interpret it. We do so mindful of legislative intent, the overall statutory context, and any pertinent regulatory guidance. We also consider any local policy definitions, to the extent they were established in the trial record or are matters of law.
The nepotism statute’s list – “superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff” – suggests that “system administrative staff” was meant to capture central-office or district-level administrators beyond the school-based leadership positions expressly listed. The associated State Board of Education Rule 160-5-1-.36 (Local Board Governance) mirrors the statute and likewise does not define the term (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). The GaDOE’s published guidance (which is essentially a commentary on the rule) clarifies that “system administrative staff is not defined in [the] SBOE rule but may be by local board policy and is commonly referred to as employees of the local school district assigned to duties other than instructing students.” (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). By this common-sense description, a broad range of non-teaching employees – e.g., curriculum coordinators, technology administrators, finance or operations personnel, etc. – would be considered “system administrative staff.” In the absence of a narrower local definition, this ordinary meaning would apply (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). We note that nepotism laws are generally construed to effectuate their remedial purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest and favoritism; thus a court should be cautious about unduly restricting the scope of who counts as an administrator in the system. As the Georgia Supreme Court has observed, the legislature deems certain familial relationships in the school system a “social ill” warranting disqualification from board service (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). We interpret the statute in that spirit.
Walker County’s local policy was referenced in conflicting ways. Appellees’ evidence (via affidavits) asserted the policy limits “system administrative staff” to those with Director titles or above (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). But we emphasize that those affidavits were not part of the trial evidence due to the procedural posture. At trial, the only evidence about the sons’ roles came from Chair Hunter’s testimony. That testimony, viewed as a whole, established the following: (1) Justin and Scott are full-time employees on the staff of the school system (as opposed to school-based teachers – indeed, their roles involve managing system-wide programs) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf); (2) their jobs are administrative in nature, not teaching roles (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf); and (3) they hold the title of Coordinator, reporting to a higher-level Director (Samples) in the organizational chart (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). Notably, Hunter initially called each of them a “director” in the sense of heading their respective program areas, then clarified that “they are called coordinators as well” (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf). This evidence was uncontroverted at trial – Appellees presented no witnesses or contrary evidence during Cagle’s case or afterward (they rested immediately after the directed verdict was granted). Thus, the trial record contained some evidence supporting the conclusion that Justin and Scott were “system administrative staff” in the ordinary meaning of that term: they are administrative employees of the school system (neither a teacher nor support staff like bus drivers or maintenance, but administrators in charge of system-wide functions). Cagle’s prima facie case was that simple – if the statute is given a commonsense reading, her evidence checked the necessary boxes (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf).
The trial judge, however, effectively imposed an additional requirement that was not in the statute’s text: that Cagle prove the sons were “directors” by title or had identical duties to a director. This was a legal error. Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51 or its implementing rules limits “system administrative staff” to those at a certain rank or pay grade. The inclusion of the word “staff” indicates the legislature’s intent to cast a wide net over non-teaching employees in administrative roles. A local board may certainly delineate which specific job titles are considered “system administrative staff” for clarity and administration of the policy. But if a local board attempts to narrowly constrict the definition in a way that undermines the purpose of the statute, a court should be wary. We do not decide here the exact boundary of a board’s discretion to define the term, because in this case the evidence is at odds: the Superintendent’s affidavit claimed a narrow definition (Directors only) (A24A1482 - Brief of Appellee.pdf), while the Board as amicus indicates the actual policy includes Coordinators (and even provided documentation listing the sons as part of system administrative staff). What matters for our decision is that the trial court, at trial, did not have before it any admissible evidence of a formal policy that excluded coordinators from the definition. Absent such evidence, the court should have defaulted to the reasonable interpretation that an employee who works in a system-wide administrative capacity is “system administrative staff.” Under that interpretation, Cagle’s evidence was not only sufficient – it was essentially undisputed – that Justin and Scott met the definition (each manages a system-wide function outside of classroom instruction).
The trial court’s finding that “having a supervisor with greater responsibilities” means the sons are not system administrators is not persuasive. In any large organization, almost every employee reports to someone higher up (except perhaps the CEO or Superintendent). A technology coordinator who reports to a technology director is still part of the administrative staff of the system – the hierarchy doesn’t negate that status. To illustrate, a school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum reports to the Superintendent; that does not make the assistant any less part of the system administration. Likewise, a Coordinator of Instructional Technology who reports to a Director of Technology is simply a lower-level member of the system’s administrative team. The statute does not say “chief administrative staff” or limit disqualification to the topmost officials. In fact, the nepotism law was specifically expanded to include “system administrative staff” (a broad term) in addition to high-profile roles like principals and superintendents. We therefore conclude the trial court misconstrued the substantive scope of the term “system administrative staff” by effectively reading in a requirement that the employee must be the head of a department (director) or have no higher supervisor in the chain other than the superintendent. That was too restrictive and finds no support in the text or purpose of the statute (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf).
Had the trial court applied the correct understanding of the law, it would have recognized that Cagle’s proof – that Appellees each have a child on the school system staff in an administrative (non-teaching) role – satisfied her initial burden. At the very least, it raised a factual question about whether those roles fall under the disqualifying policy, especially in light of conflicting indications about the Board’s own classification. Appellees could have then presented their own evidence or testimony (for example, from the Superintendent or HR director) to explain the job duties of coordinator versus director and the Board’s intent in its nepotism policy. That exchange of evidence never occurred, because the case was cut off prematurely. In sum, we hold that the evidence at trial, viewed under a proper interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51, was sufficient to preclude judgment as a matter of law at the close of Cagle’s case. There was “some evidence” – indeed, unrefuted evidence – that the sons were system administrative staff, which should have led the court to deny the motion and require Appellees to present their defense or at least proceed to a full determination on the merits (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court’s contrary conclusion was based on an error of law and an incomplete consideration of the evidence, rendering its ultimate finding (that the sons’ positions are not within the statutory category) clearly erroneous.
C. Procedural Fairness: Specificity of the Motion and Use of Extra-Record Evidence
Two additional procedural missteps reinforce our decision to reverse. First, the lack of specificity in Appellees’ directed verdict motion violated OCGA § 9-11-50(a), which requires that a motion for directed verdict “state the specific grounds therefor.” (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) This Court has long held that a directed verdict cannot be granted on a ground not raised with specificity in the motion, and a party cannot defend the grant of a directed verdict on appeal by asserting a ground that was not stated below (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). See, e.g., Rowe v. Law Offices of Ben C. Brodhead, P.C., 319 Ga. App. 190, 196 (2012); Nelson v. Polk County Historical Society, 216 Ga. App. 756, 757 (1995). Here, Appellees’ motion was as general as it could be: essentially “Plaintiff failed to prove her case.” (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) This gave the trial court no clear basis to judge the motion, and it gave Cagle no meaningful opportunity to respond or cure. If the Appellees’ contention was that Cagle failed to prove the specific job duties of the sons, or failed to introduce the formal job descriptions, or failed to prove a particular element of the statute, it was incumbent on them to say so. A generic claim of insufficient proof does not satisfy the rule. In Rogers v. Joyner, for example, a defendant’s motion which stated no grounds at all could not support a directed verdict; the Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict in that case because of the omission of specific grounds (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). 145 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1978). Likewise, Turk v. Jackson Elec. Membership Corp. holds that even in a bench trial context, a defendant must raise the particular point of insufficiency to allow the plaintiff a chance to address it (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). 117 Ga. App. 631, 632, 161 S.E.2d 430 (1968). Here, had the trial court been alerted that Appellees believed no evidence was presented as to the sons’ exact job duties or official titles, the court could have exercised its discretion to allow Cagle to reopen her case briefly to introduce the job descriptions or call an additional witness (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Georgia courts encourage trial judges to be flexible in avoiding “gotcha” moments that could derail an otherwise valid claim, especially when a minor evidentiary omission could be easily remedied (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The failure of Appellees to specify any particular missing element is “fatal to their motion,” as Cagle had no notice of what she supposedly failed to prove (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). We find that the directed verdict (involuntary dismissal) should not have been granted on an unspecified basis. At a minimum, this lack of clarity contributed to the erroneous outcome and underscores that the case was not fully litigated in the manner contemplated by law.
Second, the trial court’s consideration of evidence outside the trial record was improper and prejudicial. The court explicitly cited the summary judgment filings as the basis for its ruling (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). Those filings included affidavits attesting to the school system’s internal definitions and the sons’ titles, which were never tendered as evidence at trial. Once the case proceeded to trial, the summary judgment motion had been denied, and the case was to be decided on the evidence presented in court (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). By taking judicial notice (in effect) of contested facts from the affidavits, the court denied Cagle the right to confront and challenge that evidence. Indeed, Cagle had no chance to cross-examine the Superintendent or HR director about why they considered “Coordinator” outside the administrative staff definition, or whether the Board had ever formally adopted that narrow definition. The amicus brief suggests that, had Cagle been aware that the court would treat the affidavits as determinative, she could have introduced contrary evidence – such as the Board’s policy documents or had those affiants testify live – to show the sons were in fact considered part of the system administrative staff (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). The trial court’s shortcut thereby skewed the adversarial process: Appellees were relieved of their burden to put up evidence or be cross-examined, and Cagle was effectively sandbagged by proof she thought she had countered (via Hunter’s testimony) or could counter if needed. This was clear error. In a bench trial, a judge can of course recall what was in the case file, but when it comes to factual determinations, the judge must base those on evidence properly before the court. Here, the superior court’s over-reliance on pre-trial affidavits is enough, on its own, to warrant reversal because it amounts to applying “an incorrect legal standard,” i.e., deciding the case on a summary-judgment basis after proceeding to trial (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). See Fleeman, supra. We hold that the judgment cannot stand where it results from such a procedural irregularity that affected the outcome.
D. Amicus Curiae’s Additional Arguments
The Walker County Board of Education, appearing as amicus, provides useful context that bolsters our conclusion. It emphasizes that local boards are empowered by law to define “system administrative staff” and that Walker County’s own policy (as implemented) treats employees like Justin and Scott – who “are assigned to duties other than instructing students” – as part of the administrative staff subject to the nepotism rule (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). In fact, the Board notes that failing to consider such employees as “system administrative staff” would undermine the legislative intent, effectively allowing an easy end-run around the nepotism prohibition (for example, by simply giving a different title like “Coordinator” to what is functionally an administrative position) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). We find the amicus’s points persuasive. While we decide the case on the legal and procedural errors discussed above, we also acknowledge that the trial court’s narrow view – requiring a “director” title – constitutes a “judicial impingement of legislative authority” in the Board’s words (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). It substituted the court’s own title-based criterion for the broader standard intended by law and implemented by the Board.
The amicus brief underscores that if the trial had proceeded properly, the Board’s own evidence would have confirmed Cagle’s position rather than undermined it (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf). We cannot formally rely on evidence not in the trial record, but it is telling that the very entity whose policy was at issue interprets that policy to cover the positions in question. At a minimum, on remand, the trial court should permit development of the evidence concerning the Board’s nepotism policy and how it categorizes positions like those held by Justin and Scott. That inquiry is directly relevant to whether Appellees are disqualified under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A). We note, as a matter of law, that a local board’s definition or understanding of “system administrative staff” will be highly probative and perhaps controlling, so long as it is consistent with the statutory framework. Any such policy must still fulfill the statute’s minimum requirements (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf), and a court may disregard a definition that is a subterfuge or unreasonable. But here, all indications are that Walker County intended to enforce the nepotism rule in full, not to weaken it. Thus, the trial court on remand should give due weight to the Board’s classification of the sons’ jobs.
Conclusion
In summary, the superior court erred in granting a directed verdict (involuntary dismissal) against Cagle. Cagle presented unrebutted evidence that each Appellee has an immediate family member employed by the school system in a non-teaching, administrative capacity (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). This evidence, if believed and viewed under a correct interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51, was sufficient to make out a prima facie case that Appellees are ineligible to serve on the Board of Education (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf). The trial court’s contrary ruling was founded on an overly restrictive view of the law and an improper consideration of matters outside the trial evidence. Moreover, the directed verdict motion was procedurally deficient for lack of specificity, and the court’s reliance on undisclosed grounds and evidence deprived Cagle of a fair opportunity to respond. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the judgment must be reversed. This cause is remanded to the Superior Court of Walker County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, Cagle’s quo warranto petition should be reinstated for a decision on the merits after allowing both sides to fully present evidence. If the material facts remain undisputed, the court shall apply the correct legal standard to determine whether Appellees’ sons are “system administrative staff” within the meaning of the statute and the Board’s policy – bearing in mind the broad remedial purpose of the nepotism rule and the Board’s authority to define the term. Only after such a proceeding can a proper judgment be entered.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further action consistent with this opinion (A24A1482 - BRIEF OF APPELLANT -NT.pdf) (Undated Motion for Leave with Brief and Exhibits.pdf).
This hypothetical opinion is for illustrative purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
SECTION-3: Justice Scalia Lives! AI Scalia is a bit harsh with Judge House.
Below is a hypothetical opinion rendered in the style Justice Scalia. Please note this is strictly illustrative, for educational purposes only, and does not constitute legal advice or an actual ruling of any court.
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
Case No. A24A1482
CHELSEA CAGLE,
Appellant,
v.
MIKE CARRUTH and
KAREN HARDEN,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Walker County
Case No. 23SUCV0643
Opinion by [Fictitious Name], Presiding Judge (in the style of Justice Scalia):
INTRODUCTION
Georgia law, quite sensibly, prohibits parents and children from blending family ties with public office if the result creates conflicts of interest in the operation of local schools. See O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A). Nonetheless, the trial court below dismissed Appellant’s quo warranto petition on the theory that the employed children of Board members must be “directors” in name, rather than the broader “system administrative staff,” to disqualify their parents. The record, read according to its plain text and the statutory aim, refuses to bear such an unnecessarily crabbed interpretation.
Appellant sought to remove two Walker County school board members—Appellees—by alleging their sons, each employed in an administrative capacity by the school system, render them ineligible under Georgia’s nepotism law. At a bench trial, however, the superior court granted a “directed verdict” (i.e., involuntary dismissal), concluding Appellant failed to prove the sons were “directors.” In so ruling, the court relied on evidence it found scattered in summary judgment affidavits—not the trial record—and ignored the uncontradicted fact that the children did hold system-wide administrative roles. We reverse and remand for further proceedings, mindful that “system administrative staff” means precisely what it says: staff engaged in running the school system’s affairs, not necessarily sporting a “Director” title.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History.
Appellant filed a quo warranto action (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-60, et seq.) to question whether Appellees lawfully occupy seats on the Walker County Board of Education.
The trial court denied Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, proceeded to trial without a jury, and at the close of Appellant’s evidence granted a “directed verdict”—in effect, an involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b).
Final judgment dismissed Appellant’s claims, prompting this timely appeal.
Facts and Claims.
Both Appellees have sons employed by the Walker County school system, hired well after January 1, 2010 (the effective date for Georgia’s nepotism restrictions).
Under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A), “[n]o person who has an immediate family member … serving as … system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve” on that board.
The trial record consists chiefly of Appellant’s witness, the Board’s own Chair, who testified that each son is in an “administrative role” with district-wide duties—sometimes called a “coordinator,” sometimes even referred to as “director.” What is certain: they are not classroom teachers.
At trial’s close, Appellees barely specified any failing in Appellant’s proof—merely that she “didn’t carry her burden.” The court, for its part, concluded that failing to prove a formal “Director” title was the end of the matter. Hence this appeal.
Amicus Curiae.
The Walker County Board of Education, ironically distinct from its two board-member Appellees, filed an amicus brief supporting Appellant.
The Board’s policy documents, though not introduced at trial, reveal it includes both “Directors” and “Coordinators” in the umbrella classification “system administrative staff.”
This is precisely the kind of local policy that the State Board of Education endorses through its guidance—recognizing all non-instructional, system-level roles as subject to the nepotism ban.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review and the “Directed Verdict” in a Bench Trial
Because no jury was impaneled, the trial court’s so-called “directed verdict” is in fact an involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(b). The judge, as factfinder, can weigh evidence and need not favor the plaintiff’s proof. Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 (1975). However, he is not free to rely on documents that were never introduced as trial evidence, nor to apply a statutory definition that exists nowhere in the text. See Fleeman v. Canal Ins. Co., 302 Ga. App. 231, 232 (2010).
II. The Statute’s Plain Text: “System Administrative Staff”
The controlling statute, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A), says no board member may serve if his or her child is employed as “system administrative staff.” It does not say “Director.” Nor does it say “only those at the top rung.” We do not rewrite the legislature’s words to exclude employees who happen to be called “Coordinators.” The textual approach here is obvious: if you are staff with administrative duties over the school system’s operations, you are “system administrative staff.” Period.
The trial court grafted a requirement—that only “directors” count—onto the statutory text. One might guess the court gleaned it from affidavits that were never tendered at trial. But even had those documents been properly admitted, the controlling law hardly confines “administrative staff” to a single job label. Indeed, the local Board’s own policy (as the amicus shows) sweeps “coordinators” within “administrative staff,” consistent with the broader state rule. A caretaker cannot erase nepotism concerns by scribbling “Coordinator” onto someone’s business card.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant presented live testimony that Appellees’ sons had system-wide, non-teaching responsibilities. Appellees did not bother to present any contradictory trial evidence, presumably banking on their summary judgment materials. The trial court, ignoring the rule that summary judgment evidence must be formally introduced at trial or stipulated into the record, accepted one side’s affidavits ex mero motu. In short, the facts supporting disqualification stood unrebutted.
Under a correct interpretation of “system administrative staff,” that evidence sufficed to at least warrant hearing Appellees’ defense, rather than reflexively slamming the door after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. A trial court may, of course, weigh the credibility of the witness; but the decision here rested not on credibility, but on an invented legal standard (“director” or bust). That was error.
IV. Procedural Irregularities
Lack of Specific Grounds.
Georgia law requires that any motion for a directed verdict specify the precise grounds for the ruling. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a). Appellees gave no elaboration, leaving Appellant ignorant of what element (if any) was supposedly unproven. If the court believed “you didn’t show they’re directors” was a valid reason, counsel was obliged to say so plainly—so that Appellant might produce additional or clarifying evidence. This was never done.Reliance on Extra-Record Documents.
Once trial commences, the judge must decide the case on the evidence introduced and the facts judicially noticed or stipulated. Summary judgment exhibits do not automatically carry over if not admitted at trial. Fleeman, 302 Ga. App. at 232. Nothing in the transcript suggests either side agreed to treat those affidavits as trial evidence, and Cagle never got a chance to cross-examine the affiants. By adopting the affidavits’ hearsay-like claims, the court committed reversible error.
V. Implications of the Amicus Brief
The Board’s own nepotism policy, as described in the amicus filing, places “Coordinator” positions well within “system administrative staff.” No part of the local or state regulation restricts the nepotism bar to a “Director” label. Indeed, the State Board of Education’s guidance says “system administrative staff” basically refers to personnel with system-wide responsibilities, as opposed to teachers. One might suspect that shutting out that plain meaning effectively thwarts the statute’s purpose—precisely what the legislature enacted to guard against conflicts of interest.
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
Because the trial court imposed a requirement nowhere found in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51, relied on evidentiary materials not properly made part of the trial record, and failed to hold Appellees to the statutory obligation of stating specific grounds for a motion to dismiss, we must reverse. On remand, Appellant’s quo warranto petition stands, and the court shall hold further proceedings, letting each side present the relevant evidence and applying the nepotism statute according to its textual scope.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
All Judges concur.
Disclaimer
This hypothetical opinion is crafted solely for illustrative, educational purposes in the style of Justice Antonin Scalia’s writing and does not represent any real decision or legal advice.
Insights, Revelations, and a Dash of Unease
Frankly, the results left me impressed—and a little unnerved. The Deep Research from ChatGPT handled the task remarkably well. Even Its Scalia imitation— Surprisingly spot-on at times!
But I won’t lie—it’s unsettling to see a machine replicate human intuition and analytical skill so convincingly. Sure, there were limits: subtle nuances sometimes missed. This is a first iteration of this type of model and feature. AI can still slip up, misinterpret context, or even "hallucinate" facts. Critical thinking and human oversight are more vital than ever. But overall, this test tells me we're witnessing a transformative moment for knowledge and information gathering, reasoning, and analysis.
This type of thing will dramatically change white collar work and workforces as we know them. What is it they used to say? “Learn to Code.” Try, “Learn a trade!”, because if this is any indication AI will be transforming society soon rather than later.
So buckle up, folks. Like it or not, AI is going to take us all for a ride.
Fascinating exercise. Good stuff!